By Neil Feit
Philosophers often believe that the contents of our ideals and different cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that may be precise or fake, and their fact values don't differ at times, position to put, or individual to individual. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down within the face of ideals concerning the self. those are ideals that we convey via a first-person pronoun. Feit maintains-following David Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and others-that regularly, the contents of our ideals are homes. not like propositions, homes lack absolute fact values that don't range with time, position, or individual. Belief concerning the Self deals a sustained protection of the valuables concept of content material, based on which the content material of each cognitive angle is a estate instead of a proposition. the idea is supported with an array of recent arguments, defended from numerous objections, and utilized to a couple very important difficulties and puzzles within the philosophy of brain.
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Additional info for Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content
It seems that, to capture the potential contents of thought, we will have to admit what Lewis (1986) calls an abundant conception of properties: “The abundant properties may be as extrinsic, as gruesomely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously disjunctive, as you please. They pay no heed to the qualitative joints, but carve things up every which way” (1986: 59). On Lewis’s view, this has the result that any set of possible individuals is a property. The content of my belief that I am left-handed, for example, is the set of possible people who are left-handed.
If we say that each one believes himself to be clever, we are attributing a single belief to all of them. We are characterizing them as psychologically similar in an important way. , each person might believe the singular proposition, about himself, to the effect that he is clever). The same goes for Valerie’s de se belief that she herself is a spy. The content of this belief is the property being a spy, which Valerie takes herself to have. This is how the property theory solves the problem of de se belief.
Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. ” Perry makes this need more vivid by noting that the second belief must explain a change in his behavior, a change that the ﬁ rst belief cannot even partly explain: I believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn bag was making a mess. And I was right. But I did not believe that I was making a mess. That seems to be something I came to believe. And when I came to believe that, I stopped following the trail around the counter, and rearranged the torn bag in my trolley.
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